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Much of everyday mental life involves information that we cannot currently perceive
directly, from contemplating the strengths of friendships to reasoning about the contents
of other minds. Despite their primacy to everyday human functioning, and in particular,
to human sociality, the mechanisms that support abstract thought are poorly understood.
An explanatory framework that has gained traction recently in cognitive neuroscience is
exaptation, or the re-purposing of evolutionarily old circuitry to carry out new functions.
We argue for the utility of applying this concept to social cognition. Convergent behavioral
and neuroscientiﬁc evidence suggests that humans co-opt mechanisms originally devoted
to spatial perception for more abstract domains of cognition (e.g., temporal reasoning).
Preliminary evidence suggests that some aspects of social cognition also involve the
exaptation of substrates originally evolved for processing physical space. We discuss the
potential for future work to test more directly if cortical substrates for spatial processing
were exapted for social cognition, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of how
humans evolved mechanisms for navigating an exceptionally complex social world.
Keywords: exaptation, neural reuse, social neuroscience, metaphor, spatial cognition, perspective taking, social
distance, posterior parietal cortex
EXAPTATION AND HUMAN COGNITION
Our thoughts often include information outside of the current
sensory environment, from imagined futures to the contents of
other minds. However, the mechanisms supporting abstract cog-
nition remain poorly understood. An explanatory framework that
has gained traction recently (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Dehaene
and Cohen, 2007; Anderson, 2010) involves exaptation: co-opting
existing morphological features for novel functions (Gould and
Vrba, 1982). New cognitive capacities may have emerged over
the course of evolution when brain regions originally devoted
to speciﬁc functions were repurposed and recombined in novel
ways to process additional kinds of information (Anderson, 2010).
Analogous cortical recycling processes may occur during devel-
opment whereby cultural inventions co-opt circuitry evolved for
older aspects of cognition (Dehaene andCohen, 2007). Exaptation
and cortical recycling provide plausible neural bases for proposals
that representational resources originally devoted to space were
co-opted to process more abstract information (e.g., Boroditsky,
2011).
If our ability to reason about abstract concepts resulted
from evolutionary “tinkering” (Jacob, 1977) with neural mech-
anisms originally developed for operating on physical space, then
demanding that these mechanisms handle conﬂicting inputs per-
taining to their new and old functions simultaneously should
create response conﬂict. Further, evidence from clinical and
neuroimaging studies should suggest shared substrates for these
functions. Both kinds of evidence are accumulating with respect
to several domains of abstract cognition, most widely in studies
relating temporal and numerical processing to spatial cognition
(Hubbard et al., 2005; Bonato et al., 2012). Here, we highlight the
potential for our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
abstract social cognition to beneﬁt from a similar approach, and
review evidence that these mechanisms may be best understood
in terms of the kinds of computations (e.g., distance judgments,
perspective taking), rather than the domains of knowledge, that
they involve.
SOCIALITY AND HUMAN BRAIN EVOLUTION
Humans come into the world seemingly hardwired to detect and
connect with otherminds (Wheatley et al., 2012), andmaintaining
this predisposition is closely tied to healthy development (Pavlova,
2012). Effectively perceiving and interpreting social cues is par-
ticularly crucial for humans, who must navigate an exceptionally
ﬂexible systemof relationshipswith conspeciﬁcs (Fiske,1991). The
ability to meet the intensive computational demands of humans’
complex social environment (e.g., forging alliances, sharing inten-
tions, tactical deception; Harcourt, 1988, 1989; Tomasello et al.,
2005) is thought to have been a driving force for cortical expansion
during evolution (Dunbar, 1998). Consistent with this hypoth-
esis, feats of social cognition presumed to be uniquely human,
such as sharing intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005) and represent-
ing others’ beliefs (representational theory of mind, RTOM; Call
and Tomasello, 2008) involve cortical areas that underwent the
most evolutionary expansion (e.g., lateral posterior parietal cortex,
PPC;Van Essen et al., 2001; particularly the temporoparietal junc-
tion, TPJ; Saxe, 2006; Redcay et al., 2010). These aspects of social
cognition (e.g., RTOM) tend to involve information that cannot
be perceived directly (e.g., false beliefs), and are functionally (Gob-
bini et al., 2007) and structurally (Parkinson and Wheatley, 2012)
dissociable from older social processes (e.g., motor resonance),
suggesting they either involve entirely new structures or structures
previously devoted to non-social functions. Gould and Vrba
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(1982) suggested that exaptation of complex traits would likely be
followed by secondary adaptations to further support new func-
tions. Consistent with PPC circuitry evolved for dealingwith space
having been exapted, then expanded, to support abstract social
cognition, the PPC has an evolutionarily old role in spatial percep-
tion (it encodes space in our distant relatives, e.g., rats; Nitz, 2006),
processes both social and spatial information in humans and other
primates (Yamazaki et al., 2009), and has expanded (Van Essen
et al., 2001) and formed new connections (Mantini et al., 2013) in
humans as it came to support evermore abstract aspects of social
cognition. Recent computational modeling experiments support
the notion that human brain expansion was driven by the cog-
nitive demands of human sociality (Dávid-Barrett and Dunbar,
2013). Importantly, large brain size has a great metabolic cost; the
human brain accounts for 2% of body mass but requires 20% of
the energy that we consume (Clark and Sokoloff, 1999). In order
to outweigh the considerable metabolic cost of the larger brain
that they require, the cognitive mechanisms supporting human
sociality must have conferred substantial adaptive beneﬁts.
However, compared to other domains of abstract cognition
(e.g., mathematics; Hubbard et al., 2005), little is known about
how social forms of abstract cognition (e.g., representing beliefs
or one’s place in a social network) relate to evolutionarily older
aspects of cognition. This may be due to several factors. First,
compared to cognitive neuroscience, social cognitive neuroscience
is a young ﬁeld (Ochsner, 2007); many aspects of social cognition
have simply been studied less extensively than other aspects of
cognition. Second, early social cognitive neuroscience research
often assumed a modular view of the brain (Bergeron, 2007),
and involved searching for encapsulated brain areas devoted to
processing particular contents (Kihlstrom, 2010). If one under-
stands an aspect of cognition to be supported by a domain-speciﬁc
module, attempting to relate that aspect of cognition to other
mental phenomena may not be considered a particularly worth-
while endeavor. More recently, brain areas (e.g., TPJ; fusiform face
area) previously implicated in various facets of social informa-
tion processing (e.g., RTOM; face perception) have been found to
perform similar operations (e.g., reorienting attention, Mitchell,
2008; visual object encoding, Hanson et al., 2004) on diverse con-
tents. Consistent with the suggestion that social cognition and
physical perception involve common computations (Zaki, 2013),
the functional signiﬁcance of brain areas involved in social cog-
nition may often be best characterized in terms of the operations
they perform across multiple domains of information.
LINGUISTIC MAPPINGS BETWEEN ABSTRACT COGNITION
AND SPATIAL PERCEPTION
One window into the cognitive operations supporting abstract
thought is the language we use to describe them (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980). The spatialization of form hypothesis (Lakoff,
1987) speciﬁcally highlights the widespread use of spatial words
(e.g., “outside,” “far”) to describe conceptual relations, suggesting
that spatial schemata structure mental representations. Abstract
relations may be represented in terms of space because unlike spa-
tial relationships, they must be imagined rather than observed
(Evans, 2006). We can observe two people sitting close together,
gaze direction, or moving a vehicle forward, but can only imagine
the closeness of a friendship, a belief, or moving a meeting for-
ward (Casasanto et al., 2010). In this view, phrases like “close
friendship” or “far from the truth” are not mere ﬁgures of speech,
but rather, ﬁgures of thought that reveal the structure of mental
representations (Lakoff, 1986). The extent to which representa-
tional overlap between space and abstract domains results from
exaptation during evolution, metaphoric structuring acquired
during development, or some combination of these processes,
remains an open question. With respect to social processing, the
recruitment of brain areas involved in reorienting visual atten-
tion (TPJ) while congenitally blind individuals perform RTOM
tasks (Bedny et al., 2009) suggests that functional overlap between
social and visuospatial processes may be an innately predisposed
result of evolutionary exaptation that is now reﬂected in linguistic
metaphors for mentalizing (e.g., “Try to see things from my point
of view”).
The domain of abstract cognition that has been studied most
extensively in terms its relation to space is time. Cross-linguistic
studies indicate that people around the world use spatial language
to describe time (Boroditsky, 2011); the intuition to represent time
analogously to space may be evolutionarily predisposed. Do all
languages employ spatial language to describe social relationships
(e.g., “close friend”) and RTOM? Are mappings consistent across
languages? Some cross-linguistic variability exists in spatiotem-
poral metaphors, but certain mappings (future = forward) are
nearly ubiquitous, likely due to shared aspects of human physiol-
ogy and experience. Similarly, some English spatial metaphors for
social relationships (familiarity = closeness) may stem from the
tendency to give personal space to others based on the “closeness”
of relationships (Hayduk, 1983). To our knowledge, metaphoric
mappings between spatial and social relationships or between visu-
ospatial and social perspective taking have not been subjected to
exhaustive cross-linguistic analysis. Thus, whether or not humans
around the world use space to structure mental representations of
the magnitude and traversal of social distances remains an open
question.
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE FOR MAPPINGS BETWEEN
ABSTRACT COGNITION AND SPATIAL PERCEPTION
Behavioral mappings between space and abstract cognition have
been most extensively studied with respect to time and num-
ber. Number and space are associated implicitly; according to the
spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect,
people are faster to respond regarding small numbers on the left
side of space, and large numbers on the right side of space, even for
tasks unrelated to magnitude (Dehaene et al., 1993). Similar asso-
ciations have been documented between number and elevation
(Pecher and Boot, 2011; Lugli et al., 2013). Representational over-
lap between space and number appears to comprise a universal
human intuition (Dehaene et al., 2008), and can be documented
outside of the laboratory. When thinking about numbers, more
than 10% of individuals report automatically accessing mental
“number forms” consisting of spatial layouts (Seron et al., 1992).
It has even been suggested that on the scale of motoric action, time,
space, and quantity are processed by an analog magnitude system
(Walsh, 2003), which was co-opted to process discrete number
(Bueti and Walsh, 2009).
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Stimulus-response compatibility codes also exist for time
(Ishihara et al., 2008; Sell and Kaschak, 2011). Additionally, peo-
ple tend to spontaneously sway forward while imagining the
future and backward while imagining the past, suggesting that
representations of movement through space are automatically
activated during imagined movement through time (Miles et al.,
2010). Monkeys (Merritt et al., 2010) and infants without expo-
sure to relevant linguistic or sensorimotor mappings (Srinivasan
and Carey, 2010) exhibit representational overlap between spatial
extent and temporal duration (but not all magnitudes), suggesting
that spatiotemporal mappings originate from common process-
ing mechanisms, independently of sensorimotor grounding or
linguistic correspondences.
Social and spatial information are also behaviorally associated.
Visual perspective taking and mentalizing abilities are positively
correlated (Flavell et al., 1986; Hamilton et al., 2009). People
readily convert judgments of social compatibility into physical dis-
tances (Yamakawa et al., 2009). Words characterizing close social
distances (e.g., “us,” “friend”) are associated with close locations,
and words characterizing remote social distances (e.g., “them,”
“enemy”) are associated with far spatial locations (Bar-Anan et al.,
2007). Additionally, consistent with the suggestion that out-group
members are construed as being physically distant from oneself
(except following threat, Xiao and Van Bavel, 2012), Jones et al.
(1981) found that out-group members are rated as more homoge-
nous (i.e., having a narrower range of personal characteristics)
than in-group members. Similarly, powerful individuals, who see
themselves as exceptionally distinctive, construe others as excep-
tionally distant and homogenous (Fiske, 1993; Lee and Tiedens,
2001). It may be parsimonious to represent social and spatial
distances analogously: Construal level theory of psychological
distance (Liberman and Trope, 2008) posits that spatial, tempo-
ral and social egocentric distance share a common psychological
meaning – distance from the self in the here and now.
Although extant research highlights a possible relationship
between mental representations of social and spatial information,
more research is needed to explore this possibility, and address sev-
eral remaining questions, such as: is there a hierarchy of egocentric
psychological distance domains, in which some are more primary
than others? Do we spontaneously access representations of mov-
ing through spacewhen traversing“social”distances or perspective
taking, like during mental time travel? Are spatial representations
activated explicitly when thinking about social relationships in
everyday life, as they are for many individuals when thinking
about numbers? Exploring questions like these will lead to an
improved understanding of the mechanisms involved in abstract
social cognition.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR MAPPINGS BETWEEN
ABSTRACT COGNITION AND SPATIAL PERCEPTION
If spatial processing were repurposed for abstract cognition, one
would expect overlapping neural substrates. Past research sug-
gests that PPC systems for sensorimotor control and cognition
largely overlap (Creem-Regehr, 2009). As the PPC expanded
in size over the course of human evolution (Van Essen et al.,
2001), it appears to have expanded in function as well, leading
to suggestions that mechanisms originally devoted to representing
peripersonal space were repurposed to perform analogous oper-
ations on new contents. According to this theory, mechanisms
previously dedicated to representing spatial information about the
current sensory environment were ﬁrst co-opted to represent sim-
ulations of peripersonal space in the past and future to support
episodicmemory andprospection, and later, to represent informa-
tion in increasingly abstract frames of reference (Yamazaki et al.,
2009). A growing body of neuroimaging and neuropsychologi-
cal evidence suggests that representations of spatial and abstract
information, including aspects of social cognition, are associated
in the PPC.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in
humans implicate the PPC in representing perceptual, tempo-
ral, social and conceptual frames of reference (Yamazaki et al.,
2009). Importantly, most of these results are based on overlap-
ping activations from univariate contrasts, which could reﬂect
shared neural codes or nearby but distinct codes for different
kinds of information (Peelen and Downing, 2007). Multivariate
pattern analysis (MVPA), which compares distributed patterns of
activity between experimental conditions, rather than regionally
smoothed and averaged responses, may better characterize brain
regions’ representational contents (Figure 1). The few studies that
have used MVPA to compare spatial and abstract cognition in the
PPC support the suggestion that representations of spatial infor-
mation “scaffold” those of more abstract information. A pattern
classiﬁer trained only to distinguish PPC responses to leftward
vs. rightward saccades can distinguish mental addition from sub-
traction (Knops et al., 2009). Additionally, position and valence
words can be decoded by a classiﬁer trained only on patterns of
PPC activity corresponding to visual elevation (Quadﬂieg et al.,
2011). Because MVPA can reveal information about underlying
cognitive structures (Figure 1), this approach will be valuable in
elucidating whether use of spatial language in describing abstract
social concepts reﬂects true representational similarities or linguis-
tic bottlenecks that push people to use metaphors in the absence
of adequate domain-speciﬁc terminology (such bottlenecks have
been demonstrated in olfaction; Yeshurun and Sobel, 2010).
Further research is needed to characterize the relationship
between the PPC’s involvement in social and spatial cognition.
For instance, the TPJ is recruited both when subjects reason
about others’ false beliefs and positions in space (Abraham et al.,
2008), suggesting that this region may perform similar compu-
tations on visuospatial and social contents. MVPA could be used
to more directly test this possibility. Similarly, judgments about
hierarchy and social distance recruit areas of the PPC involved
in self-referential physical distance processing (Chiao et al., 2009;
Yamakawa et al., 2009). Does this brain region represent “high”
social status and “close” social distances analogously to how it
represents “high” spatial location and “close” spatial distances?
Again, characterizing the representational structure of the PPC
with MVPA could elucidate this question (Figure 1).
Neuropsychological data also suggests a close relationship
between representations of spatial and abstract information in
the PPC. Patients with left hemineglect following right PPC dam-
age often also neglect the “left” side of the mental number line
(Zorzi et al., 2002), whereas PPC lesion patients without neglect
show no numerical deﬁcits (Vuilleumier et al., 2004). Remarkably,
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FIGURE 1 | Interpreting fMRI responses to social and spatial tasks.
(A) Hypothetical responses from an 8-voxel region of interest (ROI) to stimuli
depicting: high social status (blue), high spatial position (orange), low social
status (green), and low spatial position (pink), as well as baseline (gray;
ﬁxation cross). (B) Comparing the magnitude of locally smoothed and
averaged responses could reveal that this ROI responds robustly to all 4
conditions relative to baseline, suggesting that it is involved in both social and
spatial processing. (C)The same data can be studied as multivoxel patterns;
responses from an ROI containing n voxels can be analyzed as n-dimensional
vectors. Examining response patterns using MVPA can reveal more detailed
information regarding the representational content of an ROI, as illustrated in
(D–H). (D) Responses from voxels 1 and 2 from the patterns depicted in (C)
for 10 examples of each stimulus category; two-dimensional patterns are
presented for clarity of visualization. Each dot represents a response to an
example of each experimental condition. Experimental conditions are
indicated by dot color. Machine learning algorithms can be used to determine
which distinctions a region contains information about (Norman et al., 2006).
Here, a linear classiﬁer would accurately distinguish the 4 experimental
conditions from baseline, as well as “high” social status and spatial position
from “low” social status and spatial position, as would be expected from a
brain region that represents social status analogously to spatial position.
(E–H) Visualizations of possible representational similarity structures
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) for responses that may not differ in average
magnitude, as in (B). Pairwise correlation distances between response
patterns can be used to characterize pattern dissimilarity. Shorter distances
between dots indicate greater pattern similarity; larger distances indicate
greater pattern dissimilarity. Local response patterns within a region that is
recruited for all 4 experimental conditions can contain information about
domain (i.e., social vs. spatial) regardless of position (i.e., high vs. low spatial
location or social status; E), position but not domain (F), or about both domain
and position (G). Alternatively, such a region may not contain information
useful in distinguishing either position or domain (H). Thus, MVPA will be
useful in testing whether overlapping fMRI activations for social and spatial
tasks reﬂect shared or distinct processing mechanisms.
normal numerical processing is restored in neglect patients follow-
ing interventions utilizing adaptation to leftward-shifting prism
glasses that restore visual attention to the previously neglected
side of space (Rossetti et al., 2004). Patients with hemispatial
neglect exhibit analogous distortions of temporal processing, sys-
tematically overestimating temporal durations (Basso et al., 1996;
Calabria et al., 2011). Spatiotemporal mappings appear to be sup-
ported by the PPC in healthy individuals, as they are diminished
following transcranial magnetic stimulation to this region (Oliv-
eri et al., 2009). Neuropsychological studies relating spatial and
abstract cognition have focused primarily on non-social domains
of abstract cognition (e.g., time, number) and space. However,
Samson et al. (2004) reported impaired mentalizing in patients
with focal lesions to the inferior PPC. To our knowledge, no
studies have tested if PPC damage is associated with abnormal
representations of one’s social network.
One limitation of neuroscientiﬁc evidence relating space and
other domains of cognition is that data are available only from
individuals in industrialized societies, and many of the corre-
sponding behavioral phenomena aremalleable to cultural learning
(Dehaene et al., 1993). Although the tendency to map various
domains of knowledge onto spatial representations appears to
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comprise a universal intuition (Dehaene et al., 2008; Parkinson
et al., 2012), the nature of these mappings is often subject to cul-
tural variation (Hung et al., 2008; Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010).
Even two weeks of tool use engenders white and gray mat-
ter changes in the macaque PPC (Hubbard et al., 2005; Iriki,
2005). Lifelong immersion in cultures emphasizing metaphors
and analogical reasoning nodoubt impacts neural representations.
Although the work summarized here is drawn from studies con-
ducted in several countries, more cross-cultural work, especially
that involving direct cross-cultural comparisons, is required to
better understand how representational overlap between spatial
and social cognition arises in the brain.
COMPARING SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS BETWEEN
DOMAINS OF KNOWLEDGE
Importantly, although multiple domains of abstract cognition
appear to co-opt mechanisms for spatial processing, differ-
ent exaptations could have arisen separately, and may operate
differently. There is a paucity of research investigating how
different domains of knowledge that use space as a “refer-
ence domain” relate to one another. Different processes may
have independently come to co-opt circuitry originally for spa-
tial computations because such an arrangement was efﬁcient
and likely given pre-existing anatomical and functional con-
straints (Cantlon et al., 2009). Consistent with this suggestion,
a recent study comparing spatial representations of number and
pitch within individuals suggests that spatial representations are
idiosyncratic to speciﬁc domains of knowledge (Beecham et al.,
2009). Thus, although past work relating spatial cognition to
non-social aspects of abstract cognition will be informative for
future studies aimed at characterizing the relationship between
spatial perception and social cognition, this will not be a trivial
endeavor.
CONCLUSION
Convergent evidence from behavior, neuropsychology, and neu-
roimaging suggest that humans use knowledge about space to
scaffold mental representations of abstract information. Whereas
most investigations have focused on non-social domains of
abstract cognition, lesswork has explored the relationship between
abstract aspects of social cognition (e.g., social distance evaluation,
mentalizing) and spatial perception. Given the substantial progress
that has stemmed from using this approach to characterize the
mechanisms that support non-social domains of abstract cogni-
tion, we predict that relating abstract social cognition to spatial
perception will be similarly fruitful. Further, given the central-
ity of sociality to human health and brain evolution (Dunbar,
1998), better understanding the mechanisms involved in social
cognition is essential to understanding the human brain more
generally.
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